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CURRENT LEGISLATION
AmENDMENT TO THE DECEDENT ESTATE LAW CLARIFYING
WAIVER OF THE SPOUSE'S RIGHT OF ELECTION AGAINST A WILL.-
Under a statute entitled "An Act to Amend the Decedent Estate Law
in Relation to Waiver of the Right of Election by a Surviving Spouse
Against or in Absence of Testamentary Provision," the New York
State Legislature, in its 170th Session, has attempted to reform sub-
division nine, section eighteen, of the Decedent Estate Law, so as to
eliminate several serious occasions of doubt and confusion.
The bill was first recommended to the legislature in 1946 1 when
it passed the state senate, but failed to pass the assembly. It was
recommended again this year 2 and finally became law. The amend-
ment became effective March 25, 1947.
In a footnote to the bill as introduced in 1946,8 the purpose of
the amendment was stated to be the codification of judicial interpre-
tations resolving ambiguities which had caused frequent litigation.
When it was reintroduced, a similar footnote was present, but this
time it was more explicit. "Its purpose is to eliminate ambiguities
in the language of subdivision 9 of section 18 of the Decedent Estate
Law which have caused frequent litigation. The amendment pro-
vides a single comprehensive statement of the requirements of a
valid waiver of a surviving spouse's right to elect against the will of
a decedent spouse." 4
Criticism of the old subdivision was so severe that one distin-
guished surrogate said of it, "The legislative text has the sorry dis-
tinction that in its two sentences are found seeds of controversy so
many as to cause doubt that any other legislative text of comparable
length has ever posed so many problems." r
Section 18, subdivision 9, of the Decedent Estate Law as
amended 6 now reads:
The husband or wife, during the lifetime of the other, may waive or re-
lease the right of election to take as against a particular last will, or as against
I N. Y. LAW REvISIoN COmMISSION REPORT, Legis. Doc. No. 65(H)(1946).
2 N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, Legis. Doc. No. 65(A)
(1947).
3N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, Legis. Doc. No. 65(H)(1946).
4N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REORT, Legis. Doc. No. 65(A)(1947).
5 Matter of Schwimmer's Estate, - Misc. -, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 481, 506
(Surr. Ct. 1944).6 N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18(9).
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any last will of the other spouse. A waiver or release of all rights in the
estate of the other spouse shall be deemed to be a waiver or release of the
right of election as against any last will. A Waiver or release to be effective
under this subdivision shall be subscribed by the maker thereof and either
acknowledged or proved in the manner required for the recording of a con-
veyance of real property.
A waiver or release of the right of election granted in this section shall
be effective, in accordance with its terms, whether
(a) executed before or after marriage of the spouse affected;
(b) executed before, on, or after September first, nineteen hundred thirty;
(c) unilateral in form, executed only by the maker thereof, or bilateral in
form, executed by both spouses affected;
(d) executed with or without consideration;
(e) absolute or conditional.
In order to facilitate discussion of the amendment and to follow
more closely the changes made therein, a footnote is inserted below
giving the text of the subdivision as it existed prior to amendment."
Particular attention must be paid to the wording, since the language
of the statute will be controlling. Nothing more than an analogy
can be found in early cases as the right of election has no common
law origin. "Common law concepts as to the requirement for an
effective release, waiver or estoppel yield to the controlling force of
the statutory provisions governing the extinguishment of this right." 
8
The first and probably the most important change to be noted
is the omission of the words "agreement" and "instrument" from the
new text. Not only was their presence a focal point of much litiga-
tion and legal argumentation, but their position in the text added to
the confusion.9
In one case it was stated that the old subdivision contemplated
two varieties of waiver: one, as to a particular will which required
7 N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATa LAw § 18(9) (prior to amendment). "The
husband or wife during the lifetime of the other may waive the right of
election to take against a particular last will and testament by an instrument
subscribed and duly acknowledged, or may waive such right of election to take
against any last will and testament of the other whatsoever in an agreement
so executed, made before or after marriage. An agreement so executed made
before the tadng effect of this section wherein a spouse has waived or released
all rights in the estate of the other spouse shall be deemed to release the right
of election granted in this section."
8N. Y. LAW REvISi CoymissioN REPoRT, Legis. Doc. No. 65(H),
p. 11 (1946).9 Matter of Schwimmer's Estate, - Misc. -, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 481 (Surr.
Ct. 1944) ; Matter of McGlone, 171 Misc. 612, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (Surr. Ct.
1939), reV'd, 258 App. Div. 596, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 316 (2d Dep't 1940), rev'd,
284 N. Y. 527, 32 N. E. 2d 539 (1940), affd sub nn., Irving Trust Co. v.
Day, 314 U. S. 556, 86 L. ed. 452 (1942) ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 633,
1 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (Surr. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 856, 6 N. Y. S. 2d
309 (1st Dep't 1938), affd, 280 N. Y. 733, 21 N. E. 2d 512 (1939); Matter of
Shapiro" 154 Misc. 55, 276 N. Y. Supp. 560 (.Surr. Ct. 1935).
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a duly acknowledged "instrument," the other, as to a waiver of the
right to take against any will where an "agreement" was required.10
This construction was partially occasioned, by the presence of a
comma between the clause relating to a "particular will" containing
the reference to an "instrument" and the clause relating to "any last
will" containing the word "agreement."
In Matter of McGlone" it was stated that there were three
kinds of waiver or release referred to: one, an instrument of waiver
against a single identified will; two, an agreement of waiver against
any will which was executed after the effective date of the statute;
three, an agreement made prior to September 1, 1930, on which date
Section 18 went into effect.
Counsel for the plaintiff in the case of In re Schwimmer's
Estate12 relied on the three variety construction. Surrogate Dele-
hanty, when confronted with this interpretation, expressly rejected
it and the idea that any distinction should have been made between
an "instrument" and an "agreement."
The cases reviewed make it clear that no distinction has been made between
a so-called "instrument" and a so-called "agreement." These cases also make
it clear that the references in the subdivision to a "particular last will" and to
"any last will" imported no legislative intent to categorize the writings effective
as waivers.18
He dispensed with the problem of the comma by referring to it as a
"mere misuse of a comma." 1 "
That the constructions placed upon the old subdivision in Matter
of Shapiro 1I and in Matter of McGlone 16 were dicta is not of par-
ticular concern to this discussion. What is important is that learned
attorneys and judges could find themselves at such variance on the
interpretation of a statute of such serious import. It is to be hoped
that by deleting these litigous words from the text of the subdivision
the legislature has removed this specious argument from the already
heavy burden the courts endure and relegated it to the academic field
of legal history. A waiver or release of the right to elect against a
particular will should, henceforth, require the same formality and like
tests of validity as one waiving the right to take against any will
whether such waiver be in the form of an instrument or agreement
lOMatter of Shapiro, 154 Misc. 55, 276 N. Y. Supp. 560 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
21 Matter of McGlone, 171 Misc. 612, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (Surr. Ct. 1939),
rezld, 258 App. Div. 596, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 316 (2d Dep't 1940), revd, 284 N. Y.
527, 32 N. E. 2d 539 (1940), aff'd sul nora., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314
U. S. 556, 86 L. ed. 452 (1942).12Matter of Schwimmer's Estate, - Misc. -, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 481 (Surr.
Ct. 1944).13 Matter of Schwimmer's Estate, - Misc.-, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 481, 506
(Surr. Ct. 1944).
14 Matter of Schwimmer's Estate, - Misc. -- 49 N. Y. S. 2d 481, 485(Surr. Ct. 1944).i5 154 Misc. 55, 276 N. Y. Supp. 560 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
16 See note 11 .supra.
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and whether it be executed "before, on or after September first nine-
teen hundred thirty" and be "effective in accordance with its
terms." 17
Another problem, previously referred to, which the new amend-
ment has attempted to resolve is the effect of waivers made before
the effective date of Section 18, i.e., September 1, 1930. Because
of the inexact wording of the old subdivision, unique arguments were
put forth to challenge waivers made before that date. Having re-
moved the distinction between "instruments" and "agreements," and
being no longer confronted with the problem of their grammatical
position in the text, it would appear definitely now that waivers or
releases executed prior to the date of the section should, provided
such waivers meet the other tests of the statute, be as effective as
those made thereafter. There is no constitutional objection to such
a concept. The right to make a will is, at best, only a statutory one
which exists at the sufferance of the legislature i8 The legislature
is entirely at liberty to do away with this right if it so desires.
A fortiori, the legislature can regulate the right and create valid limi-
tations on it. It may create a right to elect against that will, as it
has done by Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law and then provide
for the method of acquiring the right of election. Having done this,
it may provide how the right may be lost or waived. If, before 1930,
a spouse has made what amounts to a valid waiver, while in the
strictest sense she could not then have waived a right she did not
have, she precluded herself from acquiring the right. Nothing in
such a situation violates any clause of the U. S. Constitution. It was
the legislative intent from the very outset that family arrangemetits
made prior to the passing of the Decedent Estate Law, Section 18,
subdivision 9, as originally' enacted, should not be disturbed. It was
for this reason that the phrase "made before the taking effect of this
section" was then inserted. The majority of decisions, except those
led astray by the grammatical inexactitude of the subdivision, have
sought to effectuate-this intent.19 However, a finding that an agree-
ment did not contemplate a waiver of the right to elect against a will
would be perfectly sound if made on a construction of the terms of
the agreement as distinguished from a distortion of the statute.
The effect of waivers made before marriage should be the same
as those made after marriage. There has been little difficulty with
this problem. Waivers made both before and after marriage have
been upheld. The usual reason for such arrangements before mar-
riage is that either one or both of the partners may have had children
by a previous marriage for whom protection is desired.
There have been questions raised as to the form of the waiver
1N. Y. DECMENT ESTATE LAW § 18(9) (as amended).
Is Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 86 L. ed. 452 (1942).
19 Matter of McCann, 155 Misc. 763, 281 N. Y. Supp. 445 (Surr. Ct. 1935);
Matter of Gilmour, 146 Misc. 113, 260 N. Y. Supp. 761 (Surr. Ct 1932).
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or release. These have usually been concerned with whether or not
the instrument was unilateral or bilateral in form.
In Matter of McGlone 20 there was further dicta to the effect
that the agreement must be bilateral in form if the transaction oc-
curred before 1930. Once again it can be seen that the difficulty
lay in grammatical construction and that different requirements were
being made for what were thought to be different kinds of waiver.
In Matter of Moore 21 these arguments were rejected. The Law
Revision Commission, in its report in 1946 22 chose to follow the
reasonmig of the last cited case, the Schwimnmer case,23 and others,
holding that there should be no distinction between different cate-
gories of waivers and that the formality required should be uniform
whether the waiver be in the form of an instrument or an agreement,
and whether it be bilateral or unilateral, and with or without
consideration.
The requirement that a waiver or release be acknowledged has
been generally enforced. In a very recent case, Matter of Pietro La
Manna,24 in which an acknowledgment was defective, one of the sub-
scribing witnesses was permitted to make acknowledgment before
the court, thereby giving effect to the waiver. This case was decided
on the authority of Matter of Maul.25 It is to be noted that the
decision was rendered after the effective date of the amendment
under discussion. The Law Revision Commission, in its study, ex-
pressed no opposition to this form of liberality. It did, however,
think it advisable to be explicit in this regard also. Therefore, it
made the provision that a waiver or release should be proved or
acknowledged in the same manner required for the recording of a
conveyance of real property.26
As has been indicated, the purpose of this amendment was to
remove problems arising from the ambiguities contained in the old
subdivision. There was no intent to change any law. For this rea-
son it is safe to assume that, under the amendment, as before, the
same policy of liberality of construction in favor of a surviving spouse
will be applied. This is in line with the purpose of the section as a
whole, which was to enlarge and not diminish the right of the sur-
viving spouse.
It is believed that this amendment will prove to be of great value,
not only to litigants, but also to the courts and the profession as well.
Many cases which before would have required decision merely be-
20 See note 11 .rupra.
21 Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (Surr. Ct. 1937),
aff'd, 254 App. Div. 856, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y.
733, 21 N. E. 2d 512 (1939).
22N. Y. LAW RmsVxoN CommissIoN REPORT, Legis. Doc. No. 65(H)
(1946).
23 See note 12 supra.
24 Matter of Pietro La Manna, N. Y. L. J. 2486 (Surr. Ct. June 24, 1947).
25287 N. Y. 694, 39 N. E. 2d 301 (1942).
26N. Y. DECEDNT ESTATE LAW § 18(9) ; N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 304.
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cause an ingenious litigant had found a new argument by reading
into an already ambiguous claim or defense what was never intended
to exist, will never reach the court. It is hoped that in the face of
such clear language parties will inspect their case to see if it fits the
statute and fail in all attempts to distort the statute to fit their case.
A. MATTHEW BROUGHTON, JR.
GENERAL LEGACIES-WHEN CHARGEABLE AGAINST REAL PROP-
ERTY-RECENT STATUTORY AmENDMENT.-Section 47-d of the De-
cedent Estate Law, added to the law of New York State in 1947,
substitutes a statutory intent of a testator to satisfy the general leg-
aies of his will out of real property not specifically devised, where
formerly the courts had the discretion of implying an intent to charge
the realty. The statute provides:
If the personal property of a testator is insufficient for full payment of his
general legacies so much of his real property not specifically devised as shall
be necessary for payment of the balance shall be sold and the proceeds used
for such payment unless the will shall contain an express direction to the
contrary.'
This statutory provision represents a material alteration in the
law of wills. The amendment becomes effective immediately but only
applies to wills executed after August 31, 1947.
A will of a deceased person represents that person's intent. It
is that individual's decision as to the disposition to be made of his
property after his death. When a will is submitted to a court for
interpretation or construction, the intent embodied therein must be
followed by the court unless contrary to public policy or to an estab-
lished rule of law.2 It is the duty of the court to find and enforce
this intent of the testator, whether expressed in the will or implied
from the language used and the surrounding circumstances attending
the execution.
The testamentary intent with which the statute under considera-
tion deals, relates only to the general legacies of a will. A general
legacy has been defined as a gift of personal property by a last will
not amounting to a bequest of a particular thing or money, or of a
particular fund separated from all other funds. 3 Where there is an
express intent to charge a general legacy against the realty there is
no problem. However, where there is no express intent to charge
1 Laws of N. Y. 1947, c. 521.
2 Matter of Buechmer, 226 N. Y. 440, 444, 123 N. E. 741, 742 (1919);
Robinson v. Martin, 200 N. Y. 159, 164, 93 N. E. 488, 489 (1910).
a Matter of Anslinger, 185 Misc. 827, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 466 (Surr. Ct.
1945).
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